Category Archives: Latin America

Tearing Down the Walls

In a speech marking the first year of his administration, President Donald Trump reemphasized a message he communicated many times during his campaign: that “open borders” promote the proliferation of drugs, weapons, and gangs. As distasteful as that message is, he might be right. Central America serves as a chokepoint for much of the drugs manufactured in the south. The region’s unique geography focuses the intense violence and vast sums of money required to control the drug trade and aims it squarely at markets in the United States. With many governments in the region still developing after the upheavals of the Cold War, Central America’s political geography is just as important as the physical. Corruption, poverty, and weak institutions provide the fertilizer for growth of the ultimate symptom of the regional disease: organized crime gangs known locally as “Maras.”

For Trump and his supporters, construction of a border wall seems like a common sense defense but the problem is more complex than bad people that want to cross the border. The Maras represent only one aspect of a complex regional problem that doesn’t lend itself to national solutions and certainly not to simple ones. So much so that President Trump’s politicization of border security reveals the weaknesses in his simplistic and unilateral solution: success requires the cooperation and assistance of regional partners. In some cases, these are countries the President recently referred to in derogatory terms. The subsequent cacophony of protests from around the world and the resignation of at least one US Ambassador (Ambassador John Feeley in Panama) indicate President Trump’s approach may enjoy limited success.

Highway to the USA

The Central American corridor has long been a direct path to the United States for gangs like the Maras. In the 1980s, they emerged in poor neighborhoods in Los Angeles, California. At that time, many Central American countries, particularly Guatemala and El Salvador, were suffering violent civil wars that displaced thousands of people to American cities. The traumatized and largely uneducated victims of those wars found shelter for their fragile new lives in poor expatriate communities there but it was not perfect; the perpetrators understood the utility of violence and organization and they lived among their victims in America.

When peace began to take hold in Central America in the 1990s, many of the combatant “guerilla” groups demobilized, expecting to inherit a place in peaceful societies that respect human rights. However, they faced an unbalanced political and economic environment with big social differences and poverty that inhibited structural change. As a result, former guerillas and gang members living in the United States found themselves unable to assimilate in their home countries. The problem was not a small one. With an estimated 100,000 gang members in the three small countries that make up the “Northern Triangle” alone, prison systems were beyond their capacity to serve as a deterrent. Today in El Salvador, the prisons are at 320% their capacity and are now simply a base of operations for the Maras.

NUMBER OF GANG MEMBERS

Country Members Source
Guatemala 32,000 UNODC (2011 statistics)
El Salvador 60,000 Ministry of Justice and Public Safety
Honduras 36,000 USAID

With all the advantages of a peaceful sanctuary, the gangs began to strengthen. Groups like the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Barrio 18, and the Batos Locos expanded their criminal networks and learned to survive as international outlaws. They established codes with tattoos, sign language, specific words, and proprietary clothing. They established a division of labor and territory and used violence to consolidate their control. By late 2016, the murder rate attributed to MS-13 in El Salvador approached 20 per day prompting more than one government to declare war against them.

Mara Gang signs
Example of corporal codes used by gangs -signs and tattoos-. Photo credit:  https://www.republica.com/2013/06/18/interior-teme-la-implantacion-en-espana-de-las-maras-centroamericanas/

Transnational Trouble

Though there is no internationally recognized definition of “transnational organized crime,” the United Nations does define “organized criminal groups” as:

“A group of three or more persons that was not randomly formed; existing for a period of time; acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least four years’ incarceration; in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit”.

The Maras certainly fit this definition, but existing tools of international law enforcement lack the muscle to address the sheer scale and intensity of gang violence leaving governments around the world struggling with whether to treat this as a criminal or terrorist problem. Recognizing this, and perhaps capitalizing on the Trump Administration’s own war on MS-13, Guatemala declared the Maras to be international terrorist organizations in January 2018, a move likely to win wide support from outside Central America. Salvadoran Maras for example, operate as far afield as Argentina, Canada, Mexico, Spain, and Italy where they actually established a capital in Milan, one of the most important cities in Europe and home to the largest concentration of Salvadorans outside the Americas. In 2016, the Buenos Aires Minister of Security, Cristian Ritondo, declared the presence of Maras there after dismantling a gang of drug traffickers connected to MS-13.

Labeling the Maras as terrorists seems a bit of a stretch given how they are organized and recruited. Social dynamics, not politics, fuel the Maras in Central America where some 45% of gang members come from a violent family background, 91% have illiterate parents, and 70% have experienced abuse or abandonment. Alcoholism and drug addiction are commonplace and for some, the gangs are their only real source of support, love, and loyalty. Maras are organized in neighborhood “clicas”, making it very hard for gang members to leave. Those that do wish to separate from the gangs face the twin stigmas of disloyalty and dishonor but also the structural realities of having to relocate. Those that manage to leave face a life full of harsh judgment, social isolation, and fear.

These young gang members are the foot soldiers of their organizations, executing most of their operations and falling into a paramilitary structure as depicted below. Their tactics include extortion of vulnerable individuals and small businesses by the threat of violence against them or their families. The young Maras also manage drug distribution on land, accounting for 59% of the overall trade.

STRUCTURE OF A “MARA” OR GANG

Mara Gang Structure
Source Credit: https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/11121/bruneauMay05.pdf;sequence=3

Whether the Maras are criminals or terrorists or a hybrid of the two, governments agree they present a transnational challenge. Fueled as they are by regional social issues, the Maras are therefore very difficult to control. Dealing with the threat posed by these groups requires governments to change their perspectives in terms of strategy, security, and power. Enforcement requires police with the intelligence capacity to gather information on Mara smuggling routes, weaponry, membership, specific mechanisms for moving money, and the type of people that protect them. Intelligence sharing mechanisms with neighboring governments are paramount in order to combat cross-border crimes. Additionally, corrupt politicians that secretly support the Maras for personal gain must also be prosecuted. Though walls like the one President Trump wants to build will keep some people out of the United States, it’s exactly the wrong approach for this complex problem. Success depends instead on the creation of international partnerships, information sharing, and reduction of social anxieties that drive members into a life of crime. Mr. Trump, tear down these walls.


Ligia Lee Guandique is a political analyst living in Guatemala City, Guatemala. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations and a Master’s degree in Political Science from Latin American institutions. Ligia has worked with human rights-based NGOs and recently published this excellent piece on immigration issues.

Pardon Me: Peru’s Fujimori Problem

On Christmas morning 2017, protesters filled the streets of Lima, Peru in opposition to a controversial decision made by President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (known locally as PPK). His pardon of former authoritarian President Alberto Fujimori—a deeply divisive figure in Peruvian political history—inspired the manifestations that disturbed a holiday hiatus in the characteristic buzz of the capital city. Kuczynski responded to the protests with a television address, advocating for reconciliation towards the polemic former ruler and his violent past. Kuczynski’s decision leaves the citizens of Peru struggling to reconcile the surprising influence the Fujimori family still commands in Peruvian politics and a recently elected President who campaigned, then and now, on national unity.

The 79 year-old Fujimori, who left office in 2000, was nine years into a 25-year prison sentence for corruption and human rights abuses. Citing the aging former president’s terminal heart condition and tongue cancer, Kuczynski’s Presidential Pardon Commission recommended Fujimori, along with seven other inmates, be pardoned “for humanitarian reasons.” However, such benevolence from President Kuczynski does not sit well with many Peruvians who still bear the scars of Fujimori’s violent repression. Speaking on their behalf, members of the UN Human Rights Council condemned the pardon saying, “We are appalled by this decision. It is a slap in the face for the victims and witnesses whose tireless commitment brought him (Fujimori) to justice.”

pardon
The ailing Fujimori remains a controversial figure, provoking anger, contempt, and sympathy from the Peruvian people. Photo credit: http://www.dw.com/en/alberto-fujimori-perus-ex-president-leaves-clinic-free-man-after-pardon/a-42034904

In a region with a rich history of such transgressions, the pardon of a human rights abuser is certainly controversial and President Kuczynski is in no position to take political risks. Just three days prior to granting Fujimori’s pardon, Kuczynski himself narrowly escaped impeachment on corruption charges associated with an $800 million bribery scandal involving the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht. As a result, his approval rating is at a historic low (19% as of February 11, 2018). The pardon also forced him to reshuffle nine of his cabinet ministers into an aptly named “cabinet of reconciliation,” which he hopes will repair his party’s relationship with the Peruvian people in the coming months—an outcome easier said than done. Swelling street protests suggest Peruvians believe Kuczynski’s humanitarian impulses are a cover for what is actually a political survival deal to co-opt the powerful opposition. Obtaining a Presidential mandate in this manner has become an even greater point of civil contention than the actual pardon of Fujimori.

Sins of the Father

At the time of Fujimori’s election in 1990, Peru was in a state of national crisis. Guerilla terrorist groups were waging a violent insurgency and the economy was suffering from debilitating hyperinflation. Acting quickly and boldly, he instituted drastic measures to stabilize the economy and combat the insurgency. Under pressure and seeking to maintain his political freedom to maneuver, he staged a coup of his own government in 1992 with support from key military leaders in order to rewrite the constitution and purge his political opponents. The memory of the infamous purge elicits one of two responses from Peruvians: some demand justice for friends and loved ones that disappeared during that time, but many others welcomed the coup, viewing the government’s tactics as necessary to stabilize the country’s economy and bring an end to the terrorism.

Despite the lives Fujimori took, his children—son Kenji, a Congressman, and daughter Keiko, head of the main opposition party, Fuerza Popular—are the former president’s political legacy. But they are now a family divided. During Kuczynski’s impeachment proceedings, Kenji led a group of opposition lawmakers in abstaining from the impeachment vote, allowing Kuczynski to keep his seat long enough to enable the pardon of the elder Fujimori. This came as a blow to Kenji’s sister Keiko, that had just lost the 2016 presidential election to Kuczynski by a razor-thin 0.12% margin. In response, Fuerza Popular officially expelled Kenji and his allies, enforcing party discipline but destroying its simple-majority in Congress. Though Kenji and Kuczynski publicly deny accusations of quid pro quoReuters reported on January 26 that a back channel deal had been negotiated between them months earlier.

Pardon Me Too

Though the corruption allegations against President Kuczynski have not yet been proven, and his impeachment proceedings were politically driven, the charges against him are still troubling. Having run for President on an anti-corruption platform, he was quick to deny allegations that his private company, Westfield Capital, received any payments from Odebrecht. However, he now acknowledges Westfield was paid $780,000 between 2004 and 2006 while he served as Minister of Economy and Finance and later, Prime Minister. The shifting stories coincide with his reversal on the issue of Alberto Fujimori’s pardon and erode the credibility of his claims of innocence. Still worse, his rhetoric in response to calls for his resignation make him appear both desperate and despotic; he insists his removal from office would “disrupt political and economic stability” in Peru.

Pardon
President Kuczynski’s pardon of Fujimori puts him in a political bind, and may not save him from the next impeachment. Photo credit: https://www.thestar.com.my/news/world/2017/12/28/perus-culture-minister-resigns-after-fujimori-pardoned/

Moreover, Kuczynski boldly declared during his 2016 campaign there would be no pardon for the elder Fujimori. His righteous “unity” campaign platform narrowly won him the presidency, but nevertheless left his agenda vulnerable due to a lack of congressional support. Even in the wake of Keiko Fujimori’s presidential defeat – and before the fallout with her brother weakened her position – her Fuerza Popular opposition still held a commanding 71 of 130 congressional seats. Kuczynski’s questionable pardoning of Alberto Fujimori, be it a desperate act of self-preservation or a stroke of ambitious genius (or both), has secured Kuczynski’s presidency and weakened the opposition’s hold on Congress. Whether this was truly the result of a secret deal or just sibling rivalry, it set the stage for the next move against him. A new opposition – sans Kenji but now with some disgruntled former Kuczynski allies upset over the Fujimori pardon – has pledged a new impeachment proceeding when Congress resumes in March. Whether they have enough votes to be successful this time remains to be seen.

Last year, public polling indicated that up to 60% of the population favored pardon of Fujimori. Even after the pardon was granted, public polling indicated 50% of Peruvians still support Fujimori’s release. Presidential pardons are often controversial, but in this case the high-profile act of clemency faces international human rights scrutiny. The President that was supposed to represent stability instead wielded the pardon as a blatant tool of political manipulation—to the detriment of democracy. President Kuczynski will struggle to regain his reputation as a stabilizing political figure, and a shifting opposition will continue to maneuver against him, keeping the political focus on scandals and political controversy rather than on the much-needed and noble goal of national reconciliation. For the time being, whatever initiatives Kuczynski attempts, he will do so with the legal mandate of President of Peru, but without the pardon of the people.


The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Government, or the Olmsted Foundation.

Major John “JB” Boswell is a U.S. Air Force Intelligence Officer with deployments and operational experience in Afghanistan, South Korea, Hawaii, and Germany. He is currently a graduate student in History at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru in Lima as part of the George and Carol Olmsted Scholar Program.

Feeding the Beast: Guatemalan Migration

November was a monumental month for United States immigration policy as the Trump Administration made great strides in fulfilling campaign promises to curb immigration. Off-hand remarks by President Donald Trump to reporters during a cabinet meeting revealed he was ending the Diversity Visa Lottery Program which has granted residency to 50,000 immigrants every year since its inception in 1990. The move comes as a response to the New York City terrorist attack of 31 October, in which 8 people were killed as a truck barreled through a busy pedestrian walkway. The vehicle was driven by immigrant Sayfullo Habibullaevic Saipov, an Uzbek that received a Diversity Visa in 2010. Just ten days after the Saipov attack, the State Department announced it would put an end to the Central American Minor (CAM) program, which aids children and young people. CAM, which granted refugee status to some 1,500 minors and eligible family members from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador since 2014, ended within 24 hours of the announcement. Additionally, Democrats in Congress are threatening a shutdown over the elimination of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, yet another measure to protect minors seeking refuge in the United States. Though unilateral initiatives like these may temporarily reduce the rate of legal immigration from volatile regions, they will do nothing to alleviate the economic and security pressures that cause migration in the first place.

Small Countries, Big Problem

Despite the relatively small size of the countries involved, Central American immigration is a significant issue for the United States. In 2015, 3.4 million Central Americans resided there, representing 8% of America’s immigrant population. Of that group, approximately 85% arrived from only three countries: Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras—the area known as the “northern triangle” of    Central America. Guatemala, the closest of the three and the one through which all Central American immigrants must pass, was the largest source country in the region, accounting for 27% all Central American immigrants to the United States in 2013. The rates of immigration have risen steadily in recent years as the economy in the northern triangle deteriorates. United Nations data from 2010 suggests more than half of Guatemalan emigrants left for economic reasons (33.1% to improve their employment conditions and 22.8% to obtain employment). Other top motivators include family reunification (12.3%), and to a lesser extent, concerns about citizen insecurity (2.9%). Poor economic conditions influence the decision to emigrate; lack of access to transportation, basic nutrition, and a level of income that makes it impossible to support families all influence the Guatemalan exodus. Tragically, the less-educated are more likely to make the journey, but less likely to have a real understanding of the risks involved or to have marketable skills that would help them earn more money in the United States. The problem is most pronounced among men; a staggering 47% of male Guatemalan emigrants have only an elementary school education level or less. Unfortunately, ethnicity also plays a factor. The demographic most likely to undertake the journey north is the country’s indigenous poor who account for 41% of the total Guatemalan population.

guatemala migration
The rate of increase in Central American immigration to the US is steady but nonetheless alarming. Data from US Census Bureau American Community Surveys (ACS) in 2006, 2010, and 2015, and Campbell J. Gibson and Kay Jung, “Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850-2000” (Working Paper no. 81, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, DC, February 2006).

Bilateral relations with the United States are consistently among Central America’s most important foreign policy concerns. But those relations have soured over the past year as populist anti-immigration policies suggested Latin American immigrants present a direct threat to safety and security of American citizens. However distasteful the generalization of Latin Americans may be, the region has earned a reputation for instability since the mid-twentieth century. During the internal armed conflict of Guatemala (1960-1996), violence, political instability, and persecution led a large percentage of Guatemala’s population to seek asylum or refugee status in Mexico and the United States. Following the 1980s and the end of the conflict, political and economic instability subsided, but organized crime, gang violence, and the secondary effects of drug trafficking increased. The causes of Guatemalan emigration may have changed but the exodus continued.

Beauty and The Beast

Guatemala, thanks to its geography and various microclimates, is known as the land of the eternal spring. It is a country with fertile land for agriculture and is rich in coveted trade exports such as coffee and spices. Guatemalans enjoy access to both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, as well as a rich modern and ancestral cultural heritage as the center of the Mayan empire. What makes Guatemala’s situation tragic, however, is the paradox it presents. As is common in Latin America, a colonial past set the conditions for an elite-dominated society with weak institutions. When Guatemala achieved independence in 1821, lands were distributed between criollo families—those of full Spanish descent—endowing them with considerable political power and creating an economic and political class whose descendants manage the country to this day. This elite-dominated political system consistently fails to sustainably exploit the country’s resources, or squanders them through corruption and mismanagement.

For many Guatemalans, the only option is to seek opportunities elsewhere—primarily in the United States. There is an unofficial but well known route that leads from Guatemala into Mexico that then disperses migrants to the many possible entry points along the southern border of the United States. The journey can be a nightmare of hardship and danger, but one that many are willing to endure—a harsh indictment of quality of life in Guatemala. The most infamous leg of the journey involves transport on “the Beast” or “the Death Train”, named for the countless lives and limbs it consumes as migrants attempt to board the moving train in secret. Once aboard the Beast, migrants are vulnerable to grave violations of their human rights throughout their journey. Rape, extortion, kidnapping, and murder are commonplace; committed not only by the illicit agents that traffic migrants, but also by corrupt federal and state authorities whose paths the migrants cross.

Guatemala migration
Worth the risk: migrants sit precariously atop “the Beast” as they make their way north in search of opportunity. Photo credit: https://es.panampost.com/ysol-delgado/2016/08/16/conozca-a-cinco-migrantes-hondurenos-mutilados-por-el-tren-de-la-muerte/

For the Guatemalan migrants that successfully reach the United States, there is no guarantee of steady labor or prosperity. They typically find employment in restaurants, hotels, construction, and as domestic employees. Meanwhile, the are routinely subjected to discrimination and exploitation as they struggle to make minimum wage or worse. Central American immigrants constitute the largest percentage of immigrants working in the service industry, mostly because they lack the education and skills for higher-paying jobs. Despite this, remittances sent to families and loved ones in Guatemala are a crucial part of that nation’s economy. International Organization for Migration (IOM) data suggests that economic prosperity in the United States directly affects poverty rates in Guatemala. For example, the poverty rate in Guatemala rapidly increased after the economic crisis of 2008 and peaked in 2011. Regardless of changes to current immigration policy, the fortunes of the United States and its regional neighbors are inextricably linked.

Shared Problems-Shared Solutions

Despite the cold stance of the current US administration towards Central American migration, there are initiatives in both the United States Government and the international community, particularly the United Nations, aimed at helping migrants. Any person that holds an irregular status can seek assistance through technology-based information applications such as “Ask Immigration” or “MigrantApp,” a pilot program of IOM. These applications provide information about government services and answer questions related to immigration matters without the need for a lawyer or consultant. Western governments also have development programs to help Guatemala’s judiciary deal with the high number of criminals being processed by the courts. Programs like this address the root causes of emigration by contributing to rule of law and civil security, but do not address the dismal state of the economy.

Migration in North America is a regional problem and though international measures do help, success requires an effective United States policy that addresses the causes of immigration, not just its symptoms. The current US administration’s attempt to stifle the flow of migrants at the border by reducing legal immigration simply ignores the cause of the problem and promotes the illusion that the United States can somehow insulate itself from its southern neighbors and their respective domestic shortcomings. For its part, Guatemala and the rest of the Central America must increase job opportunities, strengthen their justice systems, and control illicit networks. Initiatives should be accompanied by social and cultural campaigns to discourage corruption, end discrimination, provide education, and address inequality. The way for Guatemala and the United States to control the flow of migration from the region is to improve the quality of life of those who would be most likely to leave. Comprehensive regional initiatives that strengthen economies and bolster citizen security are the long-term solutions to curb Central American migration and to stop feeding the Beast.


Ligia Lee Guandique is a political analyst living in Guatemala City, Guatemala. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations and a Master’s degree in Political Science from Latin American institutions. Ligia also has experience working with human rights-based NGOs.